3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

a balance of trade for Ukraine did not even cover the whole of the central part of the Ukrainian national territory, to say nothing of the areas that are linked up with Russia. 439

Nor did Ukrainian Galicia form an independent unit of administration in Austria; it was administered together with a Polish area, as was the same with the Ukrainian part of Bucovina, which was under Roumanian administration, and Carpatho-Ukraine under Hungarian administration. An approximately exact balance can therefore be calculated only for Dnipro-Ukraine; for the remainder, general estimates only can be given. [631]

Kryvchenko's figures for 1909—1911 give the best idea of the balance of trade for Dnipro-Ukraine before World War I. 1909—1911 were the last normal years for export trade via the Black Sea before the wars between Turkey and Italy and the Balkan wars. In the case of Ukraine which was not an independent state, a distinction must be made between export to foreign countries proper and export to other parts of the Russian empire. And the same distinction must be made for imports. The actual volume of Ukrainian imports or exports is obtained by adding these two categories, and the same holds for other sections of Ukrainian national territory. The "Russian exports from the Ukrainian provinces of the empire to foreign countries" would result in a low figure, which is by no means correct but which is sometimes quoted. The following are the characteristic features of the Dnipro-Ukrainian balance of trade before the first World War; the distinction already mentioned between exports and imports both beyond the frontiers and in trading with other parts of Russia, the latter category being a little in excess of the former; the fact that it was definitely favorable, both absolutely and relatively, particularly as regards foreign countries; the predominant share of agriculture in exports; the difference between the volume and quality of manufactured goods exported to foreign countries and those exported to other parts of Russia; the predominance of finished industrial commodities imported. Turnovers in foreign trade varied greatly, according to whether foreign countries or other parts of the Russian empire were concerned. In 1909—1911 the latter ac-

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

whether it has been properly used. For instance, one of the Ukrainian *Kolkhozy* reported that it had accomplished 50 per cent of the Sowing Plan when in reality it had only accomplished 2 per cent of it' (*Pravda*, 14 June, 1932). The harvest is continually assessed 'by the look of it in the fields' before it has been gathered in. Over a series of years the harvest has been between 20 and 30 per cent less than reports showed it to be. 113

The comparisons between Soviet actuality and pre-Revolutionary conditions are often unconvincing because Soviet statistics do not take quality into consideration. For instance, according to Soviet statistics, the output of peat has risen by 30 per cent. In reality, only the percentage of moisture retained in the peat accepted for delivery has risen.

In the *Times* article on 'The Plight of the Plan' (29 January, 1938) this question of quantity being the chief concern, irrespective of quality, in all the most important branches of industry in Soviet Ukraine, is discussed: 'The coal-mines show impressive figures but quantity is the chief concern. This has risen threefold or fourfold in the last decades, but recent disclosures indicate that the calorific value of the coal leaving Soviet mines is less even than that of the output in old Russia. The production of iron ore has gone up at a similar rate, but the final result is similar.' Cf. Makcheef, Th. (Maksheev), 'Heavy Industry in the Soviet Union,' *Contemporary Russia*, II, 2, London, 1938.

The Territory of Soviet Ukraine

Out of the 588,000 sq. km. claimed for 'Greater Ukraine', Soviet Ukraine occupied (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia in September 1939) 452,000. This area represents 2·1 per cent of the whole extent of the U.S.S.R. Soviet Ukraine occupies the territory of eight former Governments of the Empire: Kharkov, Chernigov (less five northern districts), Poltava, Ekaterinoslav (now renamed Dniepropetrovsk), Kherson, Podolia, Volhynia (excluding, until September 1939, the western districts annexed to Poland in 1921), Kiev. Three northern districts of the former Government of Tauris (Berdyansk, Melitopol, Dnieprovsk) are also included. The Putivl district of the former Kursk Government as well as some villages of the former Orel Government are also deemed to form part of the Ukraine. 131

In 1924 an 'Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic' was formed out of the Podolian districts of Balta and Tulchin along the Dniestr in order to give a semblance of self-government to the Roumanian-speaking villages of that region. The area of A.S.S.R. Moldavia is 8288 sq. km. and the population 572,000. The capital is located at Tiraspol.

The capital of the Ukrainian S.S.R. until 1934 was Kharkov; it is now Kiev.

In 1925 the administrative divisions of the area occupied by the Republic were reorganized into 40 Districts, 662 Regions, and 10,733 village and town Soviets. In 1929 the Districts were abolished out of economy and 7 *Oblasti* (Provinces) were established, roughly equivalent in size to the former Governments. These are: Vinnitsa (formerly Podolia), Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkov, Chernigov and Donets. Seven 'National Minority' Regions have been set up, and also 366 'National Minority' village Soviets 63

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

63/ in localities where non-Ukrainian elements predominate—Great Russians, White Russians, Greeks, Germans, Moldavians, Jews.

The largest towns of Soviet Ukraine are Kiev (625,000), Kharkov (650,000), Odessa (550,000), Dniepropetrovsk (former Ekaterinoslav, 325,000). Lvov, in 'Greater Ukraine', recently annexed to Soviet Ukraine, has 375,000 inhabitants. It is characteristic of current economic trends that the population has grown in Kharkov and decreased in Odessa (700,000 in 1916). Industrial centres have grown rapidly: Lugansk, Mariupol, Zaporozhie (formerly Alexandrovsk) have each of them over 100,000 inhabitants; Nikolaev and Kherson have each about 100,000. There are no large towns in Central and Western Ukraine: the most important of them, Vinnitsa and Poltava, have not more than 80,000 inhabitants each. Now we have Czernowitz (Chernovtsy), Kishinev and Jassy, each about 120,000.

The Population of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

161 The Census of 1 January 1933 gave the population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. as 31,901,000 persons. The figures for the more recent Census of 1937 are not sufficiently clear. (It is well known that the Government was displeased at the incompetent way in which this latter Census was carried out, and Stalin himself has expressed his dissatisfaction.) At any rate it is not denied that the increase of population in the Ukraine during the five years 1933–7 was at a rate lower than that for the whole Union calculated (with obvious exaggeration) at 16 per cent. The rate of increase in the Ukraine was considerably lower than in many of the eastern parts of the Union, notably Turkestan and the Kirghiz steppe—for which the obviously fantastic figures of 30 per cent and even 40 per cent were given. For the Ukraine the official increase was 6·6 per cent. On the basis of the figures for 1933, therefore, the population, allowing for increase, amounts to about 34,000,000 for 1938–9.

On the same territory about 30,000,000 people lived in 1917. In view of the fact that the normal increase in Russia before the Revolution was reckoned at 1·5 per cent p.a. and in some localities at 2 per cent p.a., the population of the Ukraine, under the social and political conditions existing under the Imperial régime, should have reached about 40,000,000 by the present day, even had there been a continuance of the movement of migration to Asiatic Russia which marked the turn of the century.

The history of the growth of population in the Ukraine during the last twenty years is of course far more complex than the bare figures would indicate. There was a terrible mortality, owing first to the Revolution and Civil War, and secondly to the two periods of famine and to the general deterioration in social and sanitary conditions. Again, parallel to a considerable migration of the peasantry, particularly during the famine periods, there was a constant flow of industrial workers from the north as a result of the Economic Plans. It is difficult therefore to avoid the following conclusions: that the growth of population during the two decades since the Revolution has been abnormally slow, but at the same time the change in the *composition* of the population has been rapid. The Ukrainians were continually disappearing or leaving their homeland while new elements were replacing them, mostly 'new-comers' from Central and Northern Russia.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the independence of the Ukrainian Communist regime in the hope that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Communist International as an independent national Communist Party. They therefore willingly accepted the doctrines of the International, which was little more than the third facet of the ruling block. By 1925 the situation had so far developed that their aspirations for this were definitely checked and even this theoretical opposition was eliminated by compelling the Ukapisty to enter into the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party, or else.

This situation makes clear the relations that existed between Ukraine and Russia during the early years of the New Economic Policy. As agriculture and industry revived in Ukraine, it was suggested that the Ukrainian government send aid to its Communist brothers. That suggestion was a command, and just as the Muscovite bands under Militant Communism scoured Ukraine for food, so under the New Economic Policy, the so-called Ukrainian government began to drain off the wealth of the country for the charitable purpose of helping its Russian brothers.

The vagueness and the ambiguity of this system was partially cleared up by the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty establishing this was signed on December 30, 1922, just as Lenin was becoming paralyzed and unable to function efficiently. It bound together the various Soviet Republics, while at the same time it paid lip service to the right of any of these Republics to secede. Of course, this was from the beginning an empty phrase, for the only people who had the power to declare the secession was the Council of Soviets of the Federal Republic and they were Communists assigned to their posts by Moscow and bound to obey the orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In addition to this, a surprising number of the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Republic now took over the corresponding posts in the Union and thus added still a fourth facet to their varied activity.

The Constitution, which was formally adopted at a Union Congress of Soviets on July 6, 1923, went still further in providing for the government of the Union. The Commissariats were divided

631 642 645 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications, Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 327 185 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 241 185 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921, which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the

656 471 661 [427] had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which, as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

[435] At the same time, the closing of the official markets rendered it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

● 631 642 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs.[1] This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

[1] [1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

republics are to fulfill certain functions in the economic system of our Union, and that on the basis of the fulfillment of a certain mission, which is to be a part of the joint mission—the industrialization of our Union—is to be founded the growth of the economy of the national republics."

In the next few years the sense of these remarks was to become perfectly clear, although it was apparently not noticed even by the more ardent Ukrainian Communists. It was to the effect that the economy of the national republics was to be fitted into the general picture of the Union and that the planning committees were to coordinate their work in such a way that there would be little or no place left for the initiative of the authorities of any republic. This did not require any action by any of the various republican governments, for step by step the central regime in Moscow gradually made more and more of the local Commissariats mere operating agencies under the control of All-Union Commissariats as these were increased in number and in scope by the vote of the Presidium of the Union or by the decisions of the All-Union Communist Party.

In this connection the final liquidation of the Ukapisty as a group in 1925 was significant. They had definitely cherished the hope that sooner or later they would be able to win recognition as a special Ukrainian Communist Party with their own seat in the Communist International. That was now becoming merely a subsidiary organ of the Russian Communist Party and there was no longer any reason for maintaining the fiction of an independent existence. The foreign Communist Parties had definitely sunk to being poor relations of the Russian Party or the All-Union Party. Their representatives were exiles from their native lands under Russian protection and under those conditions they speedily ceased to have any voice in the work of the Comintern, which existed only as a Russian propaganda organ abroad. It was therefore unrealistic for the Ukrainian Communists to build any real hopes on the Comintern or on the building of a separate Ukrainian Communism and the abolition of the Ukapisty was but a formal recognition of this fact.

186 Yet this obvious truth apparently was overlooked by Skrypnyk
●631 and, to a lesser extent, even by Khvylovy, who was absorbed in his everwidening discussion of the cultural significance of Ukrainian Communism and the role and mission of the Ukrainian Communists. While these were talking and arguing about certain ideas, the central authorities in Moscow were cleverly laying plans for removing from the field of practical politics and administration the very basis of local government for which they were fighting.

631 In the same way, reform of the administrative divisions was under way with the concealed purpose of changing the boundaries of the local sub-divisions, so that they would have a purely economic basis. This was done by the elimination of the central areas, the *gubernias* and the *okrugs* and the introduction of a two-step system of administration, the *kray* or *oblast* and the *rayon* or region, which was designed on a purely economic purpose and was admirably adapted for the elimination of local and even republic feeling.

By these and other administrative measures the essential features of the New Economic Policy were eliminated but they were done so gradually and locally that a large part of the population only realized the situation when the process was too far advanced to be affected by any scattered protests.

665 At the end of 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Communist
642 Party and this ended the long feud between him and Stalin for the control of the Party. Trotsky had quite consistently fought the New Economic Policy as a needless concession to capitalism and within a few months of his rival's defeat, Stalin reversed his policy and openly adopted a more rigid system of controls similar to those which he had attacked Trotsky for urging.

As a matter of fact the pretext for a distinction between the Soviet government and the Communist Party was wearing thin. It was a needless piece of propaganda, once the regime felt itself sufficiently strong. There was no longer the need of maintaining non-party men in places of apparent authority and with his practical sense, Stalin speedily allowed the system to lapse into the limbo of obscurity and made the Communist Party openly what it was, the dictatorial party dominated directly from Moscow.

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to administer industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new philosophy looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1917 - Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

CHAPTER TEN

The Famine

In 1921, the great famine which had swept over Ukraine had been the result of a failure of the crops, a prolonged drought and the excesses of Militant Communism which had demoralized the country. The Soviets, more or less unwillingly, allowed the despatch of foreign assistance and this saved the lives of millions. There was to be no interference in the punishment of the obstinate peasants this time. 731

In the fall of 1929, just as compulsory collectivization was being introduced, the government in Moscow made an important change in the agricultural set-up, for it transferred the Commissariat of Agriculture to the central group by establishing an All-Union Commissariat which was to be in control of all agriculture in the Soviet Union. This meant that in Ukraine all of the work which had been previously done by the local authorities was now transferred to Moscow. The republic commissariats ceased to have the power to pursue individual plans for improving the conditions of the soil, for varying the crops as their own advisers decided or as the population felt it necessary. Everything was to be done from the centre and the Ukrainian Soviet Government was compelled to hand over all of its research stations and other institutions to Muscovite control. This put a stop to the intensive development of Ukrainian agriculture which had been fostered by the Ukrainian land code and introduced the new system in which the peasants were in the same position as the workers in the factories. 641 645 631

At the same time the central regime ceased to make public the actual figures of production on the ground that they might betray to outside nations important facts as to the Soviet development. From this time on estimates and achievements were given only in 433

[1929—All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture was established 93--Amlyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

p. 13 blanc

The Thirties

● 631 642 With the completion of the compulsory collectivization, the ending of the famine and the destruction of the Ukrainian cultural renaissance, the country entered a new phase. The position in which it found itself was almost the opposite of the twenties. As, at the end of Militant Communism, the land was ruined and exhausted, so it was again. The number of domestic animals had dropped almost to the level of the earlier period, agriculture had been rendered prostrate, and material well-being had disappeared as the peasants were forced to labor on the collective farms.

On the other hand, there was none of that excitement and desire for work that had accompanied the introduction and development of the New Economic Policy, when the relaxation of the restrictions and the end of the lawlessness of Militant Communism had restored the possibility of profit to the people and when they could hope to see the results of their own labor.

More than that, the earlier period had been marked by the belief of the Ukrainian Communists that they could find an independent place in the Communist International. Then there was a conflict between those who wished a development of Ukrainian ideals and traditions, a union of the old and the new, and those who adopted a strictly Russian point of view. Now there was only one dominating force—the Russian. It had been made clear that there was to be no open antagonism. The Russian point of view was the only one that could hope to find acceptance in Communism, the Communist International had become a mere adjunct of the Russian Communist Party, all Ukrainian sympathies and expressions were banned, and the Ukrainian spirit was forced on the

631 defensive and compelled to fight a rearguard action for maintaining
642 its existence.

Step by step, Stalin and the Russian Communist Party was changing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into a Russian empire with its non-Russian dependencies and, despite the Constitution of the Union and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, it was becoming ever more and more clear that the latter was to be treated merely as a geographical colony of the new Russian-dominated union, with no attention to its wishes or its needs.[1]

This had been evident from almost the first days of the Five Year Plan. Whatever might have been the original blueprint of this, it early became evident that the Soviet Union could only carry out its work of industrialization and collectivization, if everything were forced into a single plan. In connection with this, the various republic commissariats had been reduced to All-Union commissariats and all independent power of judgment or planning had been removed from the local organs. If it were a question of developing a mine, of building a new factory, of introducing a new and more profitable crop, of constructing a new road or railroad, the authorities of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had to refer the matter to Moscow and receive the permission to act from the central authorities of the Union. How could it be otherwise?

The central government had assumed the responsibility for the development of the country and it could not carry this on, if the local communities or republics had the power to meet any but the most primitive needs without consultation and permission. Moscow had decided how industry was to be developed, which branches were to be built in the RSFSR, which in Ukraine, which in the other republics. That plan was almost absolute and, warned by the fate of the fallen Communist leaders, the new successors were ultra-cautious in venturing to express an opinion.

[625] The OGPU had been remodelled into the NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but this was placed under the same Yagoda who had been the head of the OGPU and he merely assumed greater powers and greater responsibilities for the safeguarding of the Soviet order.

1 [1930's - After famine -- Analyst]

369 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose
511 of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

642 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow were
● 631 in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the
[701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

1 [after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. - illegible]

greet the Communist Party with news of its victories and allowed this even to take precedence over a notice to the Soviet government which had hitherto claimed to be predominant. 631 642

To regularize all these changes of practice, Stalin ordered a new constitution and this was approved on December 5, 1936. It was a marvel of inconsistencies, for it was drawn up to express all of the old slogans and the modern facts.

Here was, in Article 17, the old talk of the right of free withdrawal of any Union Republic from the USSR but there was also a provision that the Supreme Soviet could annul any action of any Union Republic contrary to its wishes. There was a careful definition of the three classes of Commissariats but when the book is read critically it is easily seen that the only subjects within the competence of the Union Republics were Education, Local Industry, Communal Economy and Social Security and their decisions could legally be upset by Moscow. Article 15 provided for almost full independence, subject to Article 14, which made the Presidium of the Moscow Communist Party and of the USSR the almost undisputed master of the Union Republics, and Art. XIII, read in conjunction with this, made it possible for the Presidium to amend or change any article of the entire Constitution.

Along with all the democratic phrases in many articles was the confirmation of the unified state budget and the provision that any act of any subordinate Soviet could be easily nullified.

At the moment the democratic nations of the west were so preoccupied with the threat offered by the Nazis that they were thinking only of efforts to make a common popular front with the Soviets. They found a convenient possibility in the new Constitution and they were little disposed to pay any attention to all those phrases which formally and almost explicitly nullified all that they wished to see.

Thus, the legal basis was provided for the extension of the power of the Moscow government. Once the new Constitution was adopted and in force, the last rights of the Union Republics were nullified *de jure* as well as *de facto* and the central government was

631
642 given a free hand in its work of bending all the Union Republics to its will. The stamp of state approval was set upon the new system of administration and with that accomplished, there was small reason why the regime should not go further with its work of russification and unification.

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
166 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

½ [During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

in the eastern Ukraine in the course of twenty years. At first their actions were moderate but with the passage of time they began to develop and to reveal those tendencies which had marked their course in the east. 728

The first task was the reorganization of the country geographically. On September 28,[1] they had come to a new agreement with the Germans, whereby Germany had given up her claims to Lithuania in return for the area between the San and the Buh Rivers. So the Soviets assigned Wilno and its territory to an independent Lithuania; they annexed the region further south to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the rest to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This left to the Germans four sections of Western Ukraine, Kholmshchyna, Pidlyashshya, Posannya, and Lemkivshchyna, which were included in the Polish Government General and were governed directly by the Nazis, who allowed the appointment of a Ukrainian Central Committee to represent the Ukrainians before the higher authorities, especially in question of relief, etc. [648]

The Soviet territory[2] was divided into six districts with their centres at Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, Rivne and Lutsk. Each of these was then divided into rayons or regions with about 25,000 population. The centres of these regions were often small towns but the division was made quite arbitrarily and each centre was amply provided with bureaucratic machinery. 728 631

The economic condition of the country was extremely bad and the only saving feature was that the harvest had already been gathered, so that there was a good chance for a large part of the agricultural population, even of the poor, to survive during the winter. Yet the influx of refugees fleeing before the German advance filled the cities and the severance of connections with the west prevented the arrival of any more manufactured goods or supplies and, of course, none came from the east. [433]

On the contrary, there came a new swarm of Soviet officials who were themselves amazed at the wealth of goods in what, to the natives, seemed impoverished markets. They brought with them liberal sums of money to buy whatever they wished and they were 436

1 [1939 -- Analyst]

2 [of occupied Poland -- Analyst]

CHAPTER NINETEEN

The Soviets and the Ukrainians in Rumania

648 563 The agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union[1] had stated that the former was not interested in the fate of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, both of which contained a large Ukrainian population. It was therefore obvious that once the Soviet hands were freed from the Soviet-Finnish war, they would endeavor to acquire these additional territories.

In both Bukovyna and Bessarabia the Ukrainian cause had been less developed, although there had been far more work in Bukovyna than in Bessarabia, which had been under Russian rule. The Ukrainian uprising in Chernivtsy had not been successful in 1918 and when the territory was added to Rumania, that country put a stop to all Ukrainian work, including education although a Ukrainian theatre had developed and there was considerable secret work being done.

As a result, there was a sense of stagnation which was very different from the situation in the lands under Poland. There was less sense of coordination and when in June, 1940, the Soviets requested Rumania to hand over the new provinces, Rumania had only to submit. Most of Bukovyna and the part of Bessarabia inhabited by Ukrainians were annexed to the UkSSR. The rest of Bessarabia was added to the Moldavian ASSR, which was later raised to the dignity of a Union Republic and intended for propaganda use against Rumania.

648 631 The Soviet policy was then much the same as it had been in the area taken over from Poland. There was the same amount of propaganda declaring the "liberation" of the country from the Rumanian nobles and from international capitalism. There was

1 [1939--Analyst]

[164 blank]

the same voting for annexation to the USSR, the same enthusiastic reception in Moscow, and the same process of nationalization, of the arrest of outstanding figures, and the same destruction of the established forms of life in both areas.

The Soviets were, however, less advanced in these provinces for the application of their system required time and their stay in the area was eight months less than it was in the territory taken from Poland.

The anti-Communist leaders fled either into Rumania proper or Germany or made their way to the Polish Government General in Krakow. On the other hand, despite the attempts to seal off the country, the OUN found ways of extending its influence into Bukovyna and appealed to the more alert classes of the population.

In general the Ukrainians in these two areas formed rather a secluded enclave in the general mass of Ukrainian history and they did not play a role in proportion to their numbers. They thus scarcely enter into the account, although for a while, in 1941, there was organized a force of some 2,000 who sought to impede the Rumanian return to the country. Yet, their opposition was fruitless and when they endeavored to cut their way out, they were either destroyed by the Germans or dispersed.

433 642 727 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.

Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 648 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representative in the Ukraine. [701] Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own national flag.

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation.

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies.

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to

and the other non-Russian peoples that were conquered by the tsars, reconquered by the Soviets and now in the name of Great Russian Communism subjected to a new period of russification. 000

At the same time, there is no new evidence that the regime of Malenkov is any more tolerant of the national differences or feelings of the non-Russian peoples than was the previous regime. The steady rise in influence of Khrushchov suggests the opposite and a still greater pressure upon Ukraine.

Since World War II, the attitude of the Kremlin toward the Ukrainians has perceptibly hardened. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a member of the United Nations. It has its own government, its own flag, its own national anthem. Yet, by the orders of the Kremlin, no diplomat from outside the iron curtain is admitted to its capital of Kiev. Its government conducts all of its affairs through Moscow. 642 631

The Ukrainians are to-day the slaves of Moscow in their own country. They are liable to be deported across its boundaries at any moment and their places taken by Russians or persons from anywhere within the Soviet orbit. They are compelled to think Russian thoughts, to interpret their past, their present and their future in terms acceptable to their elder brothers, the Great Russians. The slightest deviation from that path is met with the grim charge of bourgeois nationalism, the gravest offence in the entire list of crimes.

That same process in earlier stages is taking place in all the Soviet satellites. Step by step, the culture of the other countries is being remodelled on the Russian Soviet pattern. The Russian language is being introduced and forced into the dominant place. Step by step, their national traditions are being spurned, corrupted and altered, so that they will be worthy members of the Soviet Union under Russian Communist leadership. Their contacts with the outside world are being cut off, while the Moscow radio blares out day and night the statements that the Russians are the friends of peace while the nations outside are warmongers and imperialists. 000

We might be tempted to believe that Moscow is right but we

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

but subject to Rosenberg in matters of broad policy.[15] Rosenberg realized that this vague directive would mean little unless he could count on the cooperation of the man chosen to head the Reichskommissariat. Consequently, he voiced an alarmed protest when Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia, and already widely known for his stubbornness and brutality, was suggested for the post. Since Hitler, evidently regarding Rosenberg as an impractical dreamer, wanted a determined and ruthless man in the Ukraine, Koch was nevertheless appointed.[16]

This appointment was the harbinger of worse defeats for Rosenberg's "mild" policy toward the Ukrainians. Another aspect of Nazi policy, however, aroused immediate indignation among the Ukrainian nationalists. This was a decision to keep east Galicia in the "German settlement area," i.e., to attach it to the Generalgouvernement rather than to the future Reichskommissariat. The immediate ground for this partition of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory was the desire to maintain a direct connection between the Greater Reich and Rumania, about whose continued loyalties the Nazi leaders harbored strong doubts.[17] However, a few weeks later the "unreliable" Danubian kingdom was permitted to administer all of the Ukrainian territory between the Dniester and the Southern Bug.[18] The Rumanians obviously intended eventually to incorporate the area, which they called Transnistria, into their state. Since most Ukrainian nationalist circles already hated Rumania, it is understandable that this second amputation of Ukrainian ethnographic territory was especially painful, even though the region was near the bottom of the scale of definitely Ukrainian areas in cultural development and national consciousness.[19]

[15] Chancellery Director Lammers to Rosenberg, July 18, 1941, transmitting Führerbefehl of July 17, 1941, NG 1280 (hereafter referred to as NG 1280).

[16] Memorandum, Führerhauptquartier, July 16, 1941, PS 1221 (hereafter referred to as PS 1221).

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] PS 197. At the conference of July 16 (*ibid.*) it had been tentatively decided to give Rumania only a slight territorial increase east of the pre-1939 border of the Dniester River; the decision was altered sometime within the next six weeks.

[19] On August 31, *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* had the temerity to attack the decision openly, raising the question, "Is it possible that Ukrainian land beyond the Dniester, soaked with Cossack blood, can be transferred to Rumanian administration?" On the same page the UNO organ criticized the annexation of Galicia to

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

part of this vast area had gone so far that a conference between Koch's and Rosenberg's officials on the one hand, and representatives of the army on the other, could plan the transfer to the Reichskommissariat.[39] This was accomplished gradually in the next three months.[40]

The introduction of the Reichskommissariat did not change the general basis of the provisional organization established by the Wehrmacht.[41] However, it introduced an entirely new spirit. It brought under strict control many aspects of Ukrainian life in which the Wehrmacht had left a relatively free hand to the inhabitants. The entire "Right Bank" was divided into five *Generalbezirke* with headquarters in Rovno, Zhitomir, Kiev, Nikolaev, and Dniepropetrovsk.[42] Under each *Generalkommissar* were about twenty *Gebietskommissare,* each of whom governed a *Kreisgebiet,* comprising an average of four *raions.* The Ukrainian administration operated in general only at this lowest level.[43] There were elders or *starostas* in charge of each village and a Ukrainian chief of the *raion* administration. While there were Ukrainians above this level in consultative or specialist posts,[44]

[39] PS 197.

[40] Former Polish Volhynia was transferred as early as the end of August (*Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* January 24, 1942, p. 3).

[41] There had already been set up an army administration composed of *Ortskommandanturen* (local commands) and *Feldkommandanturen* (regional commands). These military government offices had established order and begun the work of rebuilding economic and social life. Alongside them had already been installed police groups, recruited and directed by the Wehrmacht Abwehr but composed primarily of Ukrainians, as previously described. These, however, were being brought under the control of the SS police agencies. Moreover, the Wirtschaftstab-Ost had installed a Wirtschafts-Inspektion Süd, with a network of economic officers including especially the *Landwirtschaftsführer* (*La-Führer,* agricultural director) in each *raion,* who were charged with directing the economy in accordance with German needs. Cf. PS 053.

[42] PS 702. The initial organization of areas west of the Dnieper included the Soviet *oblasts* of Rovno, Volhynia, Kamenets-Podolsk, Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, Kiev, Kirovograd, and parts of Nikolaev, Dniepropetrovsk, Poltava, Zaporozh'e, Pinsk, and Brest. On September 1, 1942, the remaining parts of the Dniepropetrovsk, Poltava, and Zaporozh'e *oblasts* east of the Dnieper were transferred to the Reichskommissariat. Somewhat earlier a sixth *Generalbezirk,* Taurien, had been formed, to include the southern parts of the Zaporozh'e and Nikolaev *oblasts* (cf. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 2, 1943, p. 3).

[43] There was, however, an advisory council at the *Generalbezirk* level in at least one instance—Zhitomir (cf. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* February 25, 1942, p. 2).

[44] The adjective "Ukrainian" is used by the Germans to describe these officials, but it refers merely to persons resident within the territorial limits of the Ukraine. Actually, many were Russian, and a special effort was made by the

there was no unified framework of native administration, with the exception of the towns where there was a Ukrainian chief of administration, regardless of the size of the place involved. In the larger cities, which were not included in *Kreisgebiete,* the Ukrainian "mayors," however, were closely subjected to German *Stadtkommissare.*

Just as important as his administrative structure, was Koch's personal attitude toward the Ukrainians he was to govern. To him, they were simply an inferior race, a colonial people to be exploited for Germany's interests. "They are too inferior to be compared with Germans," [45] and "the least German worker is worth a thousand times more than the population there" [46] are typical expressions of his attitude. Consequently, this former petty railway official felt highly offended when the Ukrainian intelligentsia endeavored to organize a national life of its own. The whole tone of his administration implied that the Ukrainians were a sort of child-people, which could not achieve any degree of culture worthy of consideration; those who endeavored to do so were simply half-educated émigré agitators who must be dealt with severely, so that the simple but useful "peasants" (i.e., all non-agitators) would not be disturbed in their task of producing for the Germans.

One of the first results of Koch's determination to crush all centers of autonomous life was the destruction of the Nationalist forces remaining "above ground" in Kiev. After the suppression of the West Ukrainian force, there was still a large group of East Ukrainian supporters of the Mel'nyk organization who openly

Wehrmacht to recruit ethnic Germans (PS 197; Extracts from the Situation Report of the commander of Heeresgebiet B, Abteilung VII, October 10, 1942, PS 051; hereafter referred to as PS 051), although the latter turned out frequently to be Communist spies deliberately left behind by the Soviet regime (Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte, December 15, 1941, PS 1682; (hereafter referred to as PS 1682). Even when the *Volksdeutsche* were anti-Communist, they were frequently disliked by the Ukrainian Nationalists as Russophiles.

[45] Koch to Rosenberg, March 16, 1943, PS 192 (hereafter referred to as PS 192).

[46] Report of Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe B to Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Generalquartiermeister, Abteilung Kriegsverwaltung, April 1, 1943, PS 1130 (hereafter referred to as PS 1130), is based on an oral report of Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Clässen who was present at the Nazi Party meeting in Kiev (March 5, 1943) in which Koch made the remark.

previously described.[3] Under the conditions of German repression the nationalist parties could not afford to devote their limited strength to maintaining the initial advantage gained in these comparatively unimportant areas. By 1943, under the impact of rapidly growing Soviet partisan operations, nationalist activity seems to have ceased in Polessia west of the Dnieper.

South of Polessia runs a broad band of territory which falls into the natural vegetation region of the wooded steppe, i.e., a region of mixed prairie and woods. In contrast to the rather poor gray soil of most of Polessia, it is a land well suited for intensive agriculture, and as a result has supported for centuries the densest agricultural population of the East Ukraine.

As in the case of Polessia, the principal dividing line within the wooded steppe region is the Dnieper River. The area west of the river forms the heart of what have been known in Ukrainian history as the "Right Bank" lands. Kiev and the surrounding district had been acquired by the Russian tsar in the eighteenth century, but most of the area west of the Dnieper remained under Polish rule until 1792. The section closest to the river had had a considerable share in the Cossack tradition, but the more westerly sections, which were included in the historic provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, were deeply affected by the independent Cossack movement only during the height of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's career. This meant that serfdom had a longer and more oppressive history there than in the regions to the south and the east. While the peasants were thoroughly Ukrainian in language and customs, the cities included many Poles and Russians and an especially high percentage of Jews, who comprised from one third to one half of the urban population. This concentration of Jews, too, was a result of the historical background of the region; Poland had tolerated them, while the tsars had forbidden them to leave the Pale formed by the lands acquired in 1793 and later.[4]

Since the "Right Bank" was immediately contiguous to the nationalist bases in the West Ukraine, it was natural that the na-

[3] See Chapter V.

[4] Actually, the Pale included all the Ukraine in the nineteenth century, but Jews were less numerous on the "Left Bank."

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

established its own organization, installing a bishop in Zhitomir, as well as the energetic Ihor in Belaia Tserkov'. Ihor was replaced for a time by Emmanuel, but when the latter passed over to the Autonomous Church, he took a new post in western Volhynia, perhaps because he found the rather strong nationalist atmosphere in Belaia Tserkov' unpleasant. The fact that the Autonomous Church was able to maintain such a strong organization indicates that sentiment in the rural areas was not always ardently nationalist, even in the most "pure" of Ukrainian lands.

The wooded steppe region east of the Dnieper, the "Left Bank," constituted the second half of the traditional Ukrainian heartland. The western part had been for centuries under Polish and Lithuanian rule, coming under Moscow in the late seventeenth century, together with Kiev. The eastern part, roughly equivalent to the Kharkov *oblast,* had never been under Polish rule, but had owed allegiance to the tsars. It served as a refuge for serfs escaping from their Polono-Lithuanian masters, and hence was known as the "Slobozhanshchyna" or "Free Land." Since even the western part of the "Left Bank" had been annexed by the Russian Empire long before the partitions of Poland, however, its history diverged considerably from that of the "Right Bank."

The most interesting nationalist developments in this region during 1941–43 took place in Kharkov. While Kharkov was always claimed as the second city of the Ukraine, it never occupied the place in nationalist thinking which Kiev held, and the fact that the Russian ethnic and linguistic element there was strong aroused less indignation. Some account of the differences in the nationalist movements in Kiev and Kharkov has already been given. The essential divergence arose from the fact that the OUN-M organizers reached the latter city only in November, when their period of grace was already running out. Enthusiasm was great enough for them to secure powerful support from local people. A strong *ekzekutyva* was formed with a mayor of one of the city *raions,* an ardently nationalist professor, George Boiko, and several other local people, in addition to Kononenko, the chief West Ukrainian organizer, as members.[12] The adherence of

[12] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75; Interview 57.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

became a *fait accompli* (in 1054) its repercussions in Russia were at first very small.

Before as after, the Russian princes maintained the most intimate relations with the Western courts to which they are bound by marriages. One cannot detect any trace of enmity towards the Western Christians. Quite on the contrary the Igumen Daniel, who goes from Kiev to Jerusalem to pray on the tomb of our Saviour, feels himself fraternally connected with the Francian crusaders who are fighting in the Holy Land. In Kiev itself there are Latin monasteries and the Russian princes make donations to them. The hour has not yet arrived when the aggressive attitude of the western neighbours of Russia will arouse her enmity.

The relations which, at this epoch, existed between Russia and the West were all the more natural as their way of living had many features in common. The princely courts of Russia, with their *drouzhina* (their retainers), their military character cemented by the personal loyalty towards their overlord, their love of feasts, the songs, accompanied by the sound of the *gouslis* and by characteristic gestures, and their chivalrous idealism, all this brought them near to those of the West.

On the other hand, also like the mediæval kingdoms of the West, the Russia of Kiev, although united under St. Vladimir and Yaroslav the Wise, is still far from being a fully united State, such as had existed in Byzantium and as we know it to-day.

Under the protecting power of a prince, who kept outside enemies at bay and maintained order in the interior, the country is composed of a federation of lands and cities who have their rights and privileges and are ruled by their elders and by their popular assemblies, the *vetchi*, which deal directly with the

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

prince or with his lieutenant, the *possadnik*, giving this or that assistance in return for various protections.

These autonomous territories, *zemli* and *volosti*, are related to the ancient Slavonic federations which existed before the creation of the State of Kiev. The local dynasties which made their appearance here and there have all disappeared at the moment of the coming of the Varengians. There is not, in the whole of Russia of Kiev, another princely house but that of St. Vladimir. But the regional peculiarities could not be eliminated so easily. And it is thus that the territory of the Polianes becomes the 'Land of Kiev' as such, that of the Severianes the 'Great Land of Tchernigov,' in the west the 'Land of Volynia' retains its own characteristics, while at the foot of the Carpathians, in 'Galicia,' the elements of several tribes are fused. In the north the *volosti* correspond roughly to the old territories of the tribes. Blood relationship definitely ceased to play a role. Instead of the ties of relationship, common interests alone, resulting from being territorial neighbours, are the only ties between the inhabitants of a 'Land.'[1]

On the other hand the economic development of the towns has increased their political importance. It is they who are now at the head of the 'Lands.' The largest city of each of these territories becomes the spokesman of the whole *volost*, although all the inhabitants of the latter can, if they have the means, participate with equal rights in the deliberations of the chief city.

The princely power in Russia is therefore in no way absolute. The conception of a monarchical, unitarian, and hereditary power is not yet born.

The dynastic position is attuned to the customs which

[1] See Map No. 2.

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER II

UKRAINE DURING THE REVOLUTION 1917—1920

1. The Ukrainian Central Council

000 In March 1917, the revolution overthrew the Tsarist Government in Russia. This enabled the oppressed peoples of the former Tsarist Empire to declare their rights for political self-determination. These were: the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, White Ruthenians (Byelorussians), the Caucasian peoples (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidjanians), the peoples of Turkestan and above all the most numerous nation after the Russians, — the Ukrainians.

668 In March 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council in Kiev was formed from the representatives of the Ukrainian political organisations as representative of the Ukrainian nation. Ukrainian congresses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, also elected their deputies to the Central Council, and thus this organ became a provisional Parliament of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council tried first to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine through an agreement with the Russian Provisional Government of Prince Lvov-Kerensky.

But the Ukrainian efforts to attain autonomy met with the resolute opposition of the Russian Provisional Government and of the Russian political parties. The centralist tradition of Tsarist Russia continued to live in Russian political parties with the same vigour even after the fall of the régime. The delegates of the Central Council applied to the Russian Provisional Government in Petersburg to recognise by a public act the right of the Ukrainian nation to autonomy within the Russian state. The Russian Government refused this demand, declaring that the problem of autonomy for Ukraine should be decided by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. This reply could not satisfy the Ukrainians. For it was evident that the Russian Constituent Assembly, with the centralist efforts of the Russian parties having a majority would refuse the autonomous rights of non-Russian peoples.

Thus the Ukrainian Central Council began to realise the necessity for Ukraine to establish an autonomous order itself, without taking into notice the threats of the Russian political parties and

the Russian Government. Under these conditions the Ukrainian Central Council issued its '*Universal*' (Declaration) to the Ukrainian nation on June 10, 1917 (old style), which contained among other statements the following words: 668 636

"Ukraine shall be free ... The Ukrainian nation shall have the right to organise its life itself. A Ukrainian Assembly of the Ukrainian nation (Diet), elected in general, equal, direct and secret ballot, shall secure order in Ukraine. All laws securing this order here, in Ukraine, can be issued only by our Ukrainan Assembly".

The policy of the Ukrainian Central Council, of which the great majority was composed of the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties, met with strenous attacks on the part of the Russians. Only the leader of the Russian Communists, Lenin, for tactical reasons seeking support among the Ukrainians in the struggle of his party against the Provisional Government, made the following hypocritical statement:

"No democrat can deny the right of Ukraine for a free separation from Russia (*Pravda* 15. 6. 1917). In reality, Lenin and his party were enemies of the national self-determination of Ukraine and other nations oppressed by Russia. The Russian Communist Government showed it immediately after having seized power in Russia on November 7, 1917.

The development of the Ukrainian political movement forced the Russian Provisional Government to begin negotiations with the Ukrainian Central Council. In summer 1917, an agreement was reached, and the representatives of the parties of all national minorities sent their delegates to the Ukrainian Central Council. But the policy of Kerensky's Russian Government continued to hinder the creation of an autonomous order in Ukraine. The Petersburg Government recognised the rights of autonomy only for the northern part of Ukraine and kept the whole of southern Ukraine under its administration. But even for the realisation of this restricted autonomy the Russian Government put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Central Council. At the end of September 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council passed a resolution to call a separate Constituent Assembly for Ukraine. The Russian Provisional Government, for this reason, began a legal prosecution against the Central Council. But at this time a revolt happened in Russia, the Bolshevik Party seized power (November 7, 1917). This created a new situation in the relations between Ukraine and Russia.

2. Soviet Russia and Democratic Ukraine

668 Bolshevism was the consequence of the previous development of the Russian people, who never had had in their history any free political order. Soviet dictatorship did not meet with any serious resistance in Russia proper. The Russians showed in their attitude towards the Communist rule their traditional 'sense of obedience', as it was expressed by a Russian publicist (Guber, *On the Change of the Sign-Posts:* Prague, 1922)*). Another situation arose in Ukraine and other non-Russian regions of the former Tsarist Empire. The Russian Communist organisation in Ukraine was weak and had no support among the Ukrainian population. Among the Russian and Jewish workers in Ukraine the influence of Democratic Socialism, '*Menshevism*', also predominated. Thus, under the leadership of the Ukrainian Central Council all parties, Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish and Polish, acted together against the plans of the Russian Bolsheviks to establish dictatorship in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council blamed Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia, and began to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine, independent of the Soviet Russian Government. In its '*III. Universal*' from November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed Ukraine a democratic republic. In this document we read:

668 ●631

"In the Ukrainian Democratic Republic all liberties will be guaranteed: freedom of speech, printing, religion, meetings, associations, strikes, inviolability of person and domicile, the right to use local languages in intercourse with all offices. The Ukrainian nation had fought for long years for its national liberty, and now having attained it, will firmly protect the freedom of national development of all nationalities remaining in Ukraine; therefore we announce to the Russian, Jewish, Polish and other peoples in Ukraine a national and personal autonomy to secure their right and liberty of self-government in matters of their national life . . ."

[563]

In the III. Universal the Ukrainian Central Council fixed the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for December 27, 1917.

The Ukrainian Government did not want to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers which the Russian Communist Government under Lenin's direction was aiming at. Therefore the Ukrainian Central Council in its '*Universal*' of November 20, 1917,

*) The well known Russian writer Maxim Gorki wrote on the passivity of the Russians towards their oppressors that the "Russians could suffer more than work consciously and honestly" (*Communist International*, No. 3, Moscow 1919).

declared: "Until the peace every citizen of the Ukrainian Republic, together with the citizens of all peoples of the Russian Republic, shall stand firmly on their positions at the front and in the hinterland".

The Soviet Russian Government was from the beginning hostile to the national claims of Ukraine and other peoples. Relying on its own military force and the support of Communist groups among the various peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Russian Government was planning the conquest of Ukraine and other territories that did not recognise Soviet dictatorship.

3. Elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Russia and in Ukraine

At the end of November, 1917, in Ukraine and Russia, elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly took place. These elections in Ukraine were free, with full freedom of press and propaganda for all parties, among them the Communist. These elections showed the great difference between the political situation in Russia and in Ukraine. In Russia the adherents of Soviet dictatorship (the Communists and the party of the Left Socialists-Revolutionaries), especially in the big cities like Moscow and Petersburg, had considerable gains. This gave the Communists and Left Socialists-Revolutionaries the basis for holding power in Russia; for they had the masses of friendly workers and peasants behind them. In Ukraine at these elections the Ukrainian Socialist parties, opponents of Soviet dictatorship, won (the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries got together approximately ¾ of all cast votes). The Russian Communist Party, in spite of the immense resources from Russia for propaganda, gained in Ukraine less than 10% of the votes. In the big cities, among the workers, the Russian Communists were in a minority too; this explains the uncertainty of the Communists in Ukraine at that time in the struggle for the dictatorship of their party.

The historian of the Communist movement in Ukraine, M. Popov, remarks that even in the big industrial centres in Ukraine "the local Communists had a lack of determination to take power into the hands of the Soviets", *History of the Communist Party 'Bolsheviks' of Ukraine:* Kharkov, 1929.

4. The Problem of Peace with the Central Powers

At the end of 1917 the Russian front against the Central Powers was decaying in a catastrophic way. This decay was hastened by the ruthless Communist propaganda for an immediate peace. In

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
652 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

● [631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Congress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

is looked at by the majority of the Communist Party in Ukraine, and here in Russia even more, as some sort of strategy, a diplomatic game". 186 668

Rakovsky explained that, through the proclamation of the Soviet Union, Moscow had gained ten and twenty times more power in comparison with the previous state. Therefore Rakovsky demanded that the Government of the whole Union in Moscow should surrender 9/10 of its competence, and that this be transferred to the separate Soviet Republics. Together with the Commissar of the Interior of Soviet Ukraine of that time, Skypnyk, Rakovsky demanded that the relations between Ukraine and Russia should be these of a c o n f e d e r a t i o n.

Skrypnyk protested at the Congress of the Russian CP against the disregard of the national and cultural rights of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army that led to a forced Russification of Ukrainians. He regretted that Ukrainian schools were not allowed for the 7 millions of Ukrainians in the Russian Soviet Republic, outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Skrypnyk sharply criticised the nationalism of the Russian Communists in Ukraine who did not admit the Ukrainian language in public and Party institutions. [162]

The Russian Communist N. Bukharin stated in a speech at the 12th Congress of the Party that the Communist organisation in Ukraine had a Russian-Jewish composition with a very small number of Ukrainians. And in the meantime, Bukharin said, — "in Ukraine there is a very strong national movement" (*Records of the 12th Congress of the Russian CP*).

However, the demands of those Communists who wished to restrict Russian centralism and enlarge the rights of the separate Soviet Republics did not attain a majority at the Congress of the Russian CP. In July 1923, the strictly centralist Constitution of the USSR was ratified. Besides the theoretical declaration of the equality of rights of nations and the 'right of separation' of the peoples from Russia this constitution actually concentrates all power in the hands of Moscow, so that the acts and orders of the 'All-Union Government' are valid even then if the separate Soviet Republics would protest against them. 631

The policy of Soviet Ukrainisation was limited mostly to those institutions which had to deal with the peasants. But in the towns and industrial centres the Russian Communists tried to prevent the admission of the Ukrainian language by every means. For this reason quarrels between Ukrainian and Russian Communists arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine. Thus the Communist Alexander Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in 182 665

[In the year 1922 -- Analyst]

volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Russian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

175 The wars which broke out among the local princes after Monomakh's death belong to the darkest chapter in the history of the Kiyev Rus. Actually the kingdom ceased to exist. Nothing remained to hold it together, neither dynastic ties nor marauding expeditions, nor the church, which was powerless. For 35 years, from 1146 to 1181 there were ceaseless struggles for the throne 728 of Kiyev, and an almost /Facing page 32/ /Map 1: •631 Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938. The Ukraine was divided between four states as a result of the Peace of Riga on March 18, 1921 between the Soviet Union and Poland, the transfer of Bessarabia to Rumania, and the edicts of St. Germain and Trianon. In the west Poland was given West Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia), Carpatho-Ukraine passed from Hungary to Czechoslovakia, small parts of Carpatho-Ukraine, Bukovina and Bessarabia went to Rumania, while the major portion of Ukraine was left to the Soviet Union which established the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic on one part of Ukrainian national soil./ /Keys to the map: -.-.-. state boundaries, ——boundaries of the Soviet Republics, ---boundaries of the autonomous Soviet Republics, -..-..- boundaries of the autonomous territories, ... boundaries of the territories (oblasts), administration centers underlined./ /33/ 175 uninterrupted war was waged for sovereignty within the leading principality. The princes of Suzdal in the north waged the most bitter and brutal fight of all for supremacy. They whose descendants are to become the princes of Moscow do not shrink from an alliance with the khans of Polovtsi against Kiyev. More than once these hordes devastated the unfortunate country. Finally in 1155 Georgii Dolgorukov, Prince of Suzdal, was victorious over Kiyev, and fourteen years later the splendor of this city which had not seen its equal throughout eastern Europe melts away in the flare of Suzdal-Polovtsi pillage. (17)

17. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 91.

728
631

[Map I: Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938, cf. complete legend P. 30]

728
•631

[MAP 2 Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938]

C 178 186 order to win over the audacious swashbucklers as allies in the wars with the sultans who were also their mortal enemies. For the Cossacks were proud of their Christian Greek-Orthodox faith, and were ready to die for it at any time. "Whoever is willing to be put on the rack for his Christian faith, to be quartered, to endure all kinds of tortures for the sacred cross, whoever does not fear death, let him follow us. You should not fear death; you cannot avoid it. This is the life of the Cossacks." (29) With these promising words

29. Puluy: The Ukraine, Prague, 1915, page 7, quoted from Istoriia Vossoiedineniia Rus. /History of the Unification of Russia/

they invited their troops to join the military campaign. And they all came.

C 726 181 648 Wild, death-defying daredevils were these Cossacks, typical landsknechts by nature who enjoyed combat for its own sake, who fought under the banner of "freedom and Christianity", who today have a skirmish with the heathen hordes and tomorrow with the Catholic Polish armies, and then again are willing to protect the Poles from their enemies. Twice within four years they saved the Polish army from destruction: in 1618 from a threatening Muscovite siege and in 1621 at Khotyn from the Ottoman army which, allegedly 300,000 lances strong, was ready to overrun Poland. Nevertheless, four years later the Cossacks once again matched their strength against the Poles.

C 726 648 The fame of the warriors of the sech spread to all lands. It was the time of the Thirty Years' War and brave riders were sought after in all camps. Pope Clement VIII had already sent messengers into the sech at the end of the sixteenth century, with the message that they "form an anti-Turkish

U 631 C 712 /Facing page 48/ /Map III: The Ukraine at the time

11: Obermaier--47 J-3(no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1 Cossacks RD2

of the Union of Lublin (1569)/ /Key: ⁘⁘⁘ National boundaries. ⁘⁘⁘ Boundary between Lithuania and Poland before 1569. ═══ Boundary between Poland and Lithuania after 1569. ⁘⁘⁘ Boundaries of provinces. ⁘⁘⁘ Western boundary of the Ukrainian voivodeship. ◊ Regimental command of the registered Cossacks./ /49/ league" ⁂ (30) Emperor Rudolph II

U 631 ● C 712 C 726 648

30. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 132.

likewise ordered couriers to be sent to the hetman to persuade him to fight against the Turks. (31)

31. Ukraine and the Church Union, page 26.

In 1620 the "Nieuwe Tijdinghe", a Dutch newspaper, prints the report that the Cossacks are fighting their way through Hungary and Moravia and have captured the city of Trenčin for the emperor; 4000 people were killed. (32) The fact that the

32. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 140.

Cossacks fought on the side of the emperor in the first period of the Thirty Years' War is also confirmed by the English in the Calendar of State Papers 1910. A small Cossack division fought with Ferdinand II against the Protestants in the battle of Bila Hora (White Mountain). Again, Mazarin fetched himself a corps of Cossacks which, under the command of Chmielnicki and under the banners of Condé, even took part in the famous siege of Dunkirk. (33) Pierre Chevalier, the agent of the

C 726 648 181

33. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 313.

French cardinal, tells us about it in his history

⁂ [Text resumes here — Analyst]

11: Obermaier--47A J3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

U
•631
c
712



[Map III: The Ukraine at the time of the Union of Lublin (1569), cf. complete Legend pp. 46-47]

11: Obermaier--47B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

U
631
C
712

Map III Ukraine at the time of the union of Lublin (1569)

648 Ukraine for the Muscovite realm, strained every
175 effort to fight for the country. The Pan-Russian counter-revolutionary armies also proved themselves opponents not to be underestimated. "The campaigns of Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich and other Russian generals clearly proved that there were only two forces fighting in the Russian civil war: the old Czarist absolutism against the new Bolshevik despotism. And both of them fought with equal ferocity against the Ukraine." (41)

41. Danko: The Nation in Soviet Chains, page 25.

*

726 A surprise attack of the Ukrainian troops
175 on Lwów set off the Polish-West Ukrainian War. For weeks wild fighting raged in the streets of the city; finally the Poles succeeded in bringing in troops and forcing the Ukrainians out of Lwów during the night of November 22, 1918. The victors exercised bloody reprisals on the Ukrainian population; they destroyed Ukrainian property and dragged many respected citizens into concentration camps from which they were never to return. The Jews expiated for their neutrality with a three-day pogrom, during which whole blocks of houses went up in flames.

[631] After the loss of Lwów, the West Ukrainian
642 state included about 40,000 square kilometers with
648 four million /64/ inhabitants, among them three
726 million Ukrainians. To destroy this dwarf state
175 was the firm intention of the leaders of the Polish state of eighteen million. The Ukrainian government now had its seat at Stanislawów; Dr. Ievgen Petrushevych was the head of the state. He and many other men who were responsible for the fate of West Ukraine still regarded it as "an incident, a misunderstanding, an error" that there was any fighting at all between Poles and Ukrainians. Heedless of the front which was expanding day by

175 726 "miracle on the Vistula" took place: the Bolsheviks turned around and halted beyond the Sbrucz.

175 726 728 At the peace negotiations in Riga the partners of Andrusov met after two and a half centuries for a partition of the Ukraine. The Russians conceded the Poles the western parts of Polesia, Volhynia and Podolia, Lublin and Podlakhia in the Riga Treaty of March 18, 1921. The protest of Petliura who was not admitted to the negotiations remained unheard. Was it blind hatred of the Bolsheviks, a commission of the Poles or burning patriotism, which, after this bitter disappointment, again drove him across the borders with a small band of followers? Whatever it is, the guerilla war which the ex-dictator unleashes in East Ukraine does not change anything in his country's fate, which was definitively sealed at Riga. /80/

175 726 Driven out of his home for the last time and again disarmed by the Poles, he was nevertheless permitted to kindle rebellions in East Ukraine from within the Polish state. If the East Ukrainians bled to death and the Bolsheviks had internal difficulties, this could only please Warsaw. When the Bolsheviks finally cruelly quelled these uprisings - according to accounts in the Communist of February 23, 1923, 6000 groups of rebels were discovered and destroyed in 1921 -, Petliura, the ally of Pilsudski at the conquest of Kiyev, was now merely a troublesome foreigner in Poland. As such he was banished. /Facing page 80/ /Map V: The Ukraine Before the First World War (1914). At the end of the eighteenth century the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom disintegrated. From that time on the main part of the Ukraine belonged to the Czar's realm. Parts of West Ukraine in so-called East Galicia and Bukovina, along with Chernovtsy went to Austria, Ukrainian territory in the Carpathians to Hungary./ /Key inside map: -.-.-. National boundaries. ...Provincial boundar-

728 •631

[Ruthenians]

728 ics in Austria and boundaries of the various gub-
• 631 ermyas in Russia./

/81/

Fair Play

186 In the winter of 1938/39 the Ukrainian peasants in Poland were no longer recognizable. If after the pacification of 1930 they went about for many years bent and timid like beaten dogs, they now carried their heads higher. It was as though they felt a fresh breeze, and whenever they had business with Polish officials they omitted expressions of due respect, in fact they became cynical. They stood around in groups, talked in the most animated fashion, nudged each other meaningfully and sometimes laughed out loud.

[186] What happened? Since the end of October
101 1938, there was the "Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy"
642 beyond the Carpathians. There on the southern slopes of the Carpathians live the Ukrainian tribes of Lemki, Boyki and the Huzul. On poor soil they eke out a precarious living as small farmers, woodsmen and shepherds. In the warmer season many of them hire themselves out as harvest workers in the fertile Hungarian lowlands, and there they also trade in carriage grease. Before the First World War they shipped salt to Warsaw and fruit even as far as Moscow. Ruthenia, as their little country was once called, always belonged to the Kingdom bearing the crown of Stephen. After the downfall of the Hapsburg monarchy Czech insatiability succeeded in having "Carpatho-Russia" - that is what Ruthenia was now called - assigned to the Czechs by the edict of Saint-Germain. The "autonomy" which the little country was promised on paper in the edict remained an unfulfilled dream for its inhabitants. "Carpatho-Russia" was a province abounding in forests, which Prague could and would exploit. It was only after the solution of the Sudeten

728
•631

[Map IV: The Ukraine before the First World War (1914), cf. Complete Legend, pp. 81-82]

728
•631



[Map V "The Ukraine before the First World War (1914)"]

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

[42] Art. 14. The Ukrainian SSR reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 15. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR may not be altered without its consent.

[40] Art. 15a. The Ukrainian SSR has its own Republican military formations.

[42] Art. 15b. The Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

Art. 16. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

[41] Art. 17. Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a citizen of the USSR. Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR equal rights with citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

[31] Art. 18. The Ukrainian SSR consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Transcarpathian, Zaporozhye, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Ternopol, Kharkov, Kherson, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and control over its observance;

b) Submission of the formation of new regions constituting part of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation;

c) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions;

d) Legislation of the Ukrainian SSR;

e) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

f) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Approval of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

h) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

i) Direction of the fulfilment of the local budgets of the regions;

j) Direction of insurance and savings;

k) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

l) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

m) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

n) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernization of cities and other inhabited places;

o) Road building; direction of local transport and communications;

p) Labour legislation;

q) Direction of social maintenance;

r) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949

645

The Ministry of Cinematography
The Ministry of Light Industry
The Ministry of Forestry
The Ministry of the Timber and Paper Industry
The Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry
The Ministry of Public Health
The Ministry of the Building Materials Industry
The Ministry of the Fish Industry
The Ministry of the Food Industry
The Ministry of State Farms
The Ministry of Agriculture
The Ministry of Trade
The Ministry of Finance
The Ministry of Justice

Art. 49. The following Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR are Republican Ministries:

The Ministry of the Housing Construction Industry
The Ministry of Motor Transport
The Ministry of the Furniture and Carpentry Industries
The Ministry of the Municipal Economy
The Ministry of Local Industry
The Ministry of the Local Fuel Industry
The Ministry of Education
The Ministry of Social Maintenance.

Art. 50. The Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, within the limits of the jurisdiction of their respective Ministries, issue orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and of the orders and instructions of the Union-Republican Ministries of the USSR, and verify their execution.

Art. 51. Each Union-Republican Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directs the branch of state administration of the Ukrainian SSR entrusted to it, with the exception of only a limited number of enterprises, according to a list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and is subordinate both to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and the corresponding Union-Republican Ministry of the USSR.

Art. 52. Each Republican Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directs the branch of state administration entrusted to it and is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 53. The Government of the Ukrainian SSR or a Minister of the Ukrainian SSR to whom a question of a member of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is addressed must give a verbal or written reply in the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR within a period not exceeding three days.

Chapter V. The Local Organs of State Power

631 Art. 54. The organs of state power in regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages are the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 55. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, districts in big cities, settlements and villages are elected by the

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

63 working people of the respective regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements villages for a term of two years.

Art. 56. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, district cities, settlements and villages direct cultural, political and economic affairs on their territory, draw up the local budgets, direct the work of the organs of administration subordinate to them, ensure the maintenance of public order, assist in strengthening the defensive capacity of the country and ensure the observance of the laws and the protection of the rights of citizens.

Art. 57. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies adopt decisions and issue orders within the limits of the powers vested in them by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 58. The executive and administrative organ of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies of a region, area, district, city, settlement or village is the Executive Committee elected by it, consisting of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, a Secretary and members.

Art. 59. The executive and administrative organ of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies in a small locality is the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Secretary elected by the Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 60. The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies of a region, area, district, city, settlement or village exercises guidance in cultural, political and economic affairs within its territory on the basis of decisions taken by the corresponding Soviet of Working People's Deputies and superior state organs.

Art. 61. Sessions of regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies are convened by their respective Executive Committees not less than four times a year.

Art. 62. Sessions of district and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies are convened by their respective Executive Committees not less than six times a year.

Art. 63. Sessions of Soviets of Working People's Deputies of cities, settlements and villages are convened by their respective executive organs not less than once a month.

Art. 64. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities or districts in big cities each elect a Chairman and a Secretary for the duration of their sessions to conduct the sittings of the sessions.

Art. 65. The Chairman of a settlement or village Soviet convenes the Soviet and conducts its sittings.

Art. 66. The executive organs of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies are directly accountable both to the Soviets of Working People's Deputies which elected them and to the executive organs of the respective superior Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 67. The superior Executive Committees of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of inferior Executive Committees and to suspend decisions and orders of inferior Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 68. The superior Soviets of Working People's Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of inferior Soviets of Working People's Deputies and of their Executive Committees.

634 Art. 69. The regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments and Administrations of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Art
a General Department
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry
a Department of Public Education
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Department of Roads

and the following Administrations:

a Cinematographic Administration
a Light Industry Administration
a Local Fuel Industry Administration
an Agricultural Administration
a Food Industry Administration
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the Region, the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the Union-Republican Ministries of the Timber Industry, Meat and Dairy Industry, Building Materials Industry, Fish Industry and Textile Industry:

a Department of the Timber Industry
a Department of the Meat and Dairy Industry
a Department of the Building Materials Industry
a Department of the Fish Industry
a Department of the Textile Industry.

625 Art. 70. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Justice of the Union set up their own administrations under the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, in accordance with the conditions of the region and on the basis of the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Art. 71. The Departments and Administrations of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the corresponding regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 72. The area Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees carry on their work on the basis of the laws voted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and orders of the Regional Soviet of Workers' Deputies and their Executive Committees.

632 Art. 73. The district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 79. On the expiration of the terms of office of the regional, area, district, city settlement or village Soviets of Working People's Deputies, their executive and administrative organs retain their powers until the newly elected Soviets shall have formed new executive and administrative organs.

Chapter VI. The Budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

[637] [646] [645] Art. 80. The state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is drawn up by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and submitted by it to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for its approval.

Upon its approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is published for general information.

Art. 81. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Budget Commission, which reports its conclusions on the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet.

Art. 82. The report on the fulfilment of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and published for general information.

[651] [652] Art. 83. The budgets of the regional, area, district, city, settlement and village Soviets include the revenues from the local economy, deductions from the state revenues collected within their territory and likewise receipts from local taxes and imposts in amounts fixed by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter VII. The Courts and the Procurator's Office

[692] Art. 84. In the Ukrainian SSR justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Regional and Area Courts, the Special Courts of the USSR established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the People's Courts.

[693] Art. 85. In all Courts' cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

Art. 86. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is the highest judicial organ of the Ukrainian SSR. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR.

[646] Art. 87. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for a term of five years.

Art. 88. Regional and area courts are elected by regional and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies for a term of five years.

Art. 89. People's courts are elected by the citizens of the district on basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

695 [563] Art. 90. Judicial proceedings in the Ukrainian SSR are conducted in the Ukrainian language, persons not knowing the language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD1

mile. The Donbas shows a density of 260 to 390 per square mile, while the concentration of the population in certain industrial areas goes as high as 525 per square mile. In sharp contrast to these densely settled sections, the northern wooded area of the Poles'ye supports only 50 to 75 persons per square mile, and even less in the marshy portions. The southern steppes also show a density of only 95 to 130 per square mile.

Large villages form the most typical settlement pattern in the Ukraine. Rural population centers of as many as 15,000 or more inhabitants stretch along the river valleys or along dry ravines, where artificial ponds provide the water supply. In many instances villages merge into each other and form a continuous settlement many miles long. Surrounded by orchards and with white-washed, thatched mud huts scattered about in disorderly fashion, they often present a singularly charming appearance.

About one third of the population lives in urban centers. The Ukrainian SSR counts fifteen cities of over 100,000 inhabitants and more than forty cities with a population of over 50,000. The large centers lie mainly in the Donets Basin, along the Dnieper and the shores of the Black Sea, as well as in the western Ukraine.

The national composition of the population of the Ukraine is quite homogeneous. The Ukrainians constitute about 80 percent of the total. Among the more important minorities are the Russians, who live principally in the Donbas and in the northern section, the Belorussians in the northwest, Poles in the west, and Bulgarians in the southwest. Before the Second World War, Jews formed a considerable percentage of the urban population, especially in the right-bank towns and in the western Ukraine. A considerable number of Volga Tatars are also found in the Donets Basin.

The Ukrainians constitute the second most important national group in the USSR. Their language, their culture and their mode of life are closely related to those of the Russians. Long split among several powers, the Ukrainians were as late as the end of the eighteenth century under the rule of the Russians (left-bank Ukraine), of the Poles (right-bank Ukraine), and of the Turks (southern steppes). Shortly thereafter the major portion of the Ukrainian people came under Russian rule, but many still remained in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in Rumania. In 1917 the Ukrainian SSR was created, but it was not until the final annexations of territory from Poland (1939), Rumania (1940),

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD1

and Czechoslovakia (1945) that most Ukrainians of eastern Europe became united into one territorial entity.

The present administrative-territorial system was introduced into the Ukrainian SSR in 1932 by the creation of seven oblasts. By 1939 the number had increased to fifteen. Following the partition of Poland, in 1939, and the annexation of the Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR, six more oblasts (Volyn', Rovno, L'vov, Drogobych, Ternopol', and Stanislav) were added. In 1940 Rumania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. The extreme northern and southern sections of the territory were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR as the Chernovtsy and Izmail oblasts in view of their predominant Ukrainian population. However, the Ukraine lost the greater part of Moldavian Autonomous SSR (formed in 1924) when the Moldavian territory was joined to the central part of Bessarabia to form the newly constituted Moldavian SSR. Seven districts (rayons) of the Moldavian Autonomous SSR, including those of Balta and Kotovsk remained in the Ukrainian SSR as part of the Odessa Oblast, due to the predominance of a Ukrainian population. In 1945 the western frontier of the Ukrainian SSR was changed in favor of Poland with the adoption of the so-called "Curzon line," which left the city of Przemyśl (Russian *Peremyshl'*) and areas to the northeast and southwest, along the San River, to Poland. In June, 1945, the Carpatho-Ukraine, or Ruthenia, was transferred from Czechoslovakia and constituted into the Transcarpathian (*Zakarpatskaya*) Oblast. At present the Ukrainian SSR is divided into twenty-five oblasts.

The economy of the Ukrainian SSR combines a rich agricultural development with a powerful mining and metallurgical industry, based in particular on the coal of the Donets Basin and the iron ore of Krivoy Rog. As a result of the industrialization of the USSR, the Ukraine became not only a basic grain-exporting region of the USSR, as well as an area of intensive agriculture and agricultural industry, but also the major coal and metallurgical base and heavy-machine construction center of the USSR. The Ukraine has more than one fifth of the total sown area of the USSR and produces one quarter of the grain, two thirds of the sugar, three fifths of the coal and pig iron, one half of the salt and about one fifth of the machines and chemicals.

In 1940 the Donets Basin furnished 85 million tons of coal per year. It supplied not only all the industry of the Ukraine itself but also the

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD1

WESTERN UKRAINE

THE WESTERN UKRAINE includes those areas (except for Izmail Oblast) which were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after 1939 and later. Six oblasts (Rovno, Volyn', Ternopol', L'vov, Stanislav, and Drogobych) were annexed in the autumn of 1939 following the partition of Poland and the Soviet occupation of its eastern section. Chernovtsy Oblast was formed in the Northern Bukovina and the extreme northern section of Bessarabia after the acquisition of these territories from Rumania, in the summer of 1940. The Transcarpathian Oblast was ceded to the Ukraine according to an agreement with Czechoslovakia in 1945. The Western Ukraine can be roughly considered in four geographical sections: the Carpathian section in the south, on the slopes and in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, the Poles'ye, a northern lowland along the right affluents of the Pripet River, the hilly central section in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, and the Transcarpathian section.

The Carpathian section of the Western Ukraine includes the oblasts of Chernovtsy, Stanislav, and Drogobych. Its economy is based essentially on the mineral resources of the area: petroleum, natural gas, salt, and potash, and on the lumber resources on the slopes. There are a number of health resorts in the valleys.

Chernovtsy Oblast

Area, 3,200, population, 900,000

Chernovtsy Oblast lies along the upper Prut and the Dniester rivers. The forests (mainly beech), building materials, salt, and petroleum are found in the higher foothills. Agriculture puts the emphasis on grains (wheat, corn, and barley), potatoes and sugar beets in the south and on fruit growing along the Dniester, in the northeast. Sheep raising and lumbering are the main activities in the mountains. Sawmilling, woodworking, sugar refining, flour milling, and wine making are the chief rural industries.

Chernovtsy (Rumanian *Cernăuţi*) called Chernovitsy until 1944, lies on a terrace above the Prut River. It has large textile and machine industries and produces chemicals, lumber, and food products.

Storozhinets (Rumanian *Storojineţ*) is a road center in the agricultural region southwest of Chernovtsy.